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Abstract At best, the empirical evidence for human impact
on climate change, more specifically, the anthropogenic
global warming (AGW), is based on correlational research.
That is, no experiment has been carried out that confirms or
falsifies the causal hypothesis put forward by the Interna-
tional Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that anthropogenic
increasing of green house gas concentrations very likely
causes increasing of the (mean) global temperature. In this
article, we point out the major weaknesses of correlational
research in assessing causal hypotheses. We further point
out that the AGW hypothesis is in need of potential
falsifiers in the Popperian (neopositivistic) sense. Some
directions for future research on the formulation of such
falsifiers in causal research are discussed. Of course, failure
to find falsifying evidence in empirical climate data will
render the AWG hypothesis much stronger.
1 Introduction
“Most of the observed increase in global average temper-
atures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely due to
the observed increase in anthropogenic green house gas
concentrations, and it is likely that there has been
significant anthropogenic warming over the past 50 years
averaged over each continent except Antarctica” (IPCC
2007: p. 5). In this proposition, which was part of the
summary for policy makers of the famous IPCC report on
climate change which has influenced politicians throughout
the world, the phrase “very likely due to” needs clarifica-
tion. As such, it is a causal statement of the form “increase
of X very likely causes increase of Y.” More specifically,
the causal statement is “anthropogenic increasing of GHG
concentrations very likely causes increasing of the (mean)
global temperature.”
According to Bunge (1959; see Tacq 2010), a causal
relationship between X and Y requires that (a) the
relationship is conditional (if X, then Y); (b) unique (one
cause, one effect); (c) asymmetrical (when X causes Y, then
Y does not cause X); and (d) invariable (no probabilistic
causality). Although elegant in its simplicity, application of
Bunge's rigid framework does not seem to expand very
much beyond the realm of elastic collisions as observed,
e.g., in a game of billiard. On the other end of this rigid
definition stands American pragmatism, where one ceases
to look for metaphysical grounds of a theory but instead,
measures the value of a hypothesis on causality based on
the cash-value of the idea (James 1907):
Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete
difference will its being true make in anyone's actual
life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences
will be different from those which one would obtain if
the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's
cash-value in experiential terms?
Since as a matter of fact, the cash-value of the idea of
AGW has proved to be positive, this alone may serve as
sufficient motivation for its maintenance in science. For
those satisfied with this argument, Q.E.D., and the story
ends here. However, others may not dismiss the fact so
easily that causal statements in science have been subject to
debate for as long as science exists (see, e.g., Pearl 2000;
Tacq 2010). As early as in 1737, the philosopher David
Hume wrote that
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When we look about us towards external objects, and
consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in
a single instance, to discover any power or necessary
connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the
cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence
of the other.
In other words, regardless of the rationale on which a
causal statement has been based, its validity will always
remain to be open for dispute. While early scientists
depended on the principle of verification for the validation
of theories (including causal hypotheses), the critique of
Hume gradually convinced scientists that other principles
should be applied in order to establish whether or not a
theory was scientific. Whereas the positivists of the Wiener
Kreis still advocated that scientific theories are sound if
they can be verified by empirical data, the logical short-
comings of the verification criterion led Karl Popper to
radically brake with this tradition.
Briefly stated, the major shortcoming of the verification
criterion is that it allows only experience to decide upon the
truth or falsity of scientific statements (Popper 1965: 42;
see Rapp 1975). Popper's most important contribution to
the debate was to state that every scientific theory should be
able to list counter-examples which, if found in reality,
disconfirm (“falsify”) the theory. This is the principle of
falsification. In the case of anthropogenic global warming
(AGW), the theory should list one or more counter-
examples that could (potentially) disconfirm the theory.
This listing of potential falsifiers appears to be missing in
the present debate on AGW. In fact, some skeptics in the
debate on AGW point out that all natural climatic disasters
are used as evidence (verification) for the human impact on
climate, whereas evidence that a post WWII global warming
is absent in, e.g., the Greenland Ice-Core Bore Record is
ignored as falsifying evidence (see, e.g., Dahl-Jensen et al.
1998; Feldman and Marks 2009). Needless to say that a
methodologically sound theory would encompass all avail-
able evidence and not “cherry-pick” those pieces of evidence
that confirm the theory while ignoring those that do not.
Unfortunately, when a theoretical phenomenon such as
AGW becomes a global political program, it soon becomes
vulnerable to methodological fallacies in the realm of social
and political science. Leaving aside the quality of used data
and methods, the IPCC report aimed at reaching a consensus.
Consensus is recognized by some social scientific method-
ologists as the defining feature of social science (Swanborn
1996; Feyerabend 1987). However, if reaching consensus
were really the hallmark of sound science, the scientific
theories of Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin, and many others
would never have seen daylight. Also, there is no guarantee
that majorities will reach sensible opinions (think only of the
democratic Weimar republic in the 1930s). Finally, scientists
need to make a living, and they will not bite the hand that
feeds them, an argument used by some advocates of AGW
who claim that climate skeptics are sponsored by “Big
Carbon”. Therefore, consensus must be dismissed as a
defining feature of science. The IPCC recognizes the
limitation of consensus by adding the phrase ‘and much
evidence’ when it makes statements as in, e.g., “there is high
agreement and much evidence that with current climate
change mitigation policies and related sustainable develop-
ment practices, global GHG emissions will continue to grow
over the next few decades” (IPCC 2007: p. 7, italics added).
We must therefore discuss the sources of evidence that are
used to formulate the many causal statements on AGW
issued in the report.
The quality of all scientific research depends of course,
on the quality of the data that are being processed.
Regardless of the quality of the (statistical) model used
for analysis, if bad data are fed to the model, then the result
of the analysis will be bad. This principle is known as
garbage in–garbage out. In other words, if the data that are
fed into climate models are open to dispute, then so are the
projections of these models. In the scientific (i.e., peer-
reviewed) literature, several authors have expressed doubts
about the quality of the analyzed data and the possibility to
derive at valid inferences on human impact on global
warming (e.g., Jaworowski 1994; Soon et al. 2004;
Michaels 2008; Pielke et al. 2007). However, since the
author of this article is no expert on climate science, the
issue of whether or not data used in climate science are
of enough quality will be left for others to decide.
Instead, in this methodological note on the making of
causal statements in the debate on AGW, we focus on
the study designs that are used to establish the causal
hypotheses. The following sections discuss briefly the
consequence of a lack of experiment and the relying on
correlational data for establishing causal relationships.
This discussion prepares the ground for the formulation
of possible falsifiers of AWG. Some concluding remarks
remain in the last section.
2 On the establishing of causality in time series
2.1 The consequence of the lack of experiment
The challenge in corroborating any causal hypothesis is to
determine what kinds of evidence constitute actual proof of
the hypothesis. The study design appropriate for establishing
causality, that is for establishing cause and effect relation-
ships is the experiment, as any freshman's course or
introductory work in research methodology will reveal
(e.g., Kumar 2005: 100; Ford 2000: 141; de Vaus 2001:
70; Gomm 2008: 60; Neale and Robert 1986: 134). The key
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to the conducting of true experiments is the installing of
control groups that receive no, or different, experimental
interventions. However, despite efforts to find planets with
equal conditions in the universe, no replicate of the Planet
Earth has been found at the time that this article went to
press and therefore, no true experiment can be conducted
that would compare climate change on a planet with and
without anthropogenic carbon dioxide production. Further-
more, artificial interventions where for instance, the impact
of doubling anthropogenic carbon dioxide on global warm-
ing is investigated are if not infeasible, surely unlikely to be
carried out by contemporary researchers. These observations
may seem rather straightforward, but their consequences are
far from trivial, for the immediate implication is that the
only study design that is available to test the AGW
hypothesis is the longitudinal study, either a panel or a trend
study (see, e.g., Kumar 2005: 111).
Lack of a control group in experiments make the testing
of counterfactual relationships, for instance ¬ X→¬ Y (“if
there were no Industrial Revolution, then there would not
have been an increase in global temperature”), impossible.
In sciences where experimentation is difficult if not
impossible, such as the social sciences, researchers rely on
correlational research in order to establish causal relation-
ships. Simply stated, two variables correlate positively
when increasing values of X correspond to increasing
values of Y. Thus, a change of X leads to a change of Y,
which is one of the prerequisites for establishing causality
(see Section 1). In order to find a (statistically significant)
correlation, however, there is no requirement that X
precedes Y. Both hypotheses X→Y and Y→X will
produce identical correlations.
Furthermore, a significant correlation of empirical data
can be observed when, in fact, no causal relationship is
involved. For instance, the priests of ancient Egypt were
paid for seeing to it that, in the evening, the sun would set
and in the morning, the sun would come up again. Because
they upheld their ceremonies every evening and morning,
and because every morning the sun did come up and every
evening the sun did set, the priests proved to the general
public that their actions had value. Of course, the causal
relationship between the making of offerings and the
behavior of the sun was nil, whereas the correlation
between the actions of the priests and the sun equaled
one, that is, the correlation was maximal.
Another well-known problem relates to the so-called
third variable (e.g., Neale and Robert 1986: 239). In order
to illustrate this phenomenon, a much used example is
where the number of churches in a city is compared with
the number of crimes committed in a city: with a large
enough sample of cities, a positive correlation will be found
indicating that churches cause crime (or vice versa). The
third or intervening variable, in this case, is the size of the
city, and the empirical correlation is called spurious. In
sum, even when correlation is a necessary condition in
causality, it is not a sufficient one.
2.2 Granger causality
In the literature, the notion of Granger causality has received
increasing interest (e.g., Dufour and Renault 1998), an
econometric concept that has also been applied in the
analysis of climate data (e.g., Stern and Kaufmann 1999;
Verdes 2005; Kauffmann et al. 2006). Briefly stated, X→gY
that is a variable X is said to Granger cause another variable
Y if the observation of X up to time t can help one to predict
Y at time t+1, when the corresponding observation on Y is
available. That is, G-causation implies that knowledge of the
past of X and Y produces better predictions of Y then
knowledge of the past of Y alone (Freeman 1983). This
definition of causality does not require presence of a
plausible theory for the causal connection. Rather, it focuses
on one important aspect of causal hypotheses, namely the
power to predict, and the validity of a predictive model can
be expressed in terms of error in prediction and model fit
statistics (e.g., likelihood ratios).
Use of Granger causality in order to confirm the AGW
hypothesis has received critique in the literature (e.g., Triacca
2001, 2005). The most important problem with statistical
models such as Error Correction Models and related time
series models is that they cannot serve as proof of a causal
relationship. Firstly, because the associations that are found
may be spurious, meaning that one or more intervening
variables have been omitted in the model. Of course, such
intervening variables can be included in the model, e.g., in a
vector Z of auxiliary variables (which requires of course,
measurement of this vector), but proving that all intervening
variables have been captured is impossible. This is because
absence of proof is not equivalent to proof of absence.
Secondly, how does one prove that X is the precursor for
Y in a statistical analysis of empirical data? At the very
least, the goodness-of-fit statistics of the models where both
data generating processes (X→ gY and Y→ gX) are
assessed need to be compared. This comparison can have
four possible outcomes with corresponding conceptual and
operational hypotheses:
Conceptual hypothesis: Operational hypothesis:
1. X→Y ∧ ¬ (Y→X) X→gY has significant model fit and
Y→gX does not
2. ¬ (X→Y) ∧ Y→X X→gY does not have significant model
fit and Y→gX does
3. ¬ (X→Y) ∧ ¬ (Y→X) Neither X→gY nor Y→gX fit the data
4. X→Y ∧ Y→X Both X→gY and Y→gX display
significant model fit
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In applied research, the operational hypothesis relates
to the expected outcome from statistical inference based
on analysis of empirical data. It is important to note that
validity of the operational hypothesis provides evidence
for, not proof of, validity of the conceptual hypothesis.
For instance, the first outcome provides evidence for the
simple mechanistic hypothesis that X is a cause (or at
least a mediator) of Y; and similarly, the second
outcome provides evidence for the alternative hypothesis
that Y causes (or is a mediator of) X. Outcome 3 is a
falsifier for both outcome 1 and outcome 2. The fourth
outcome suggests the possibility of a feedback loop, i.e.,
causal recursion.
Modeling matters in terms of verification (and falsifica-
tion) become complicated in the case that a feedback loop
is present. Among issues that need to be taken into account
are the different time lags for the X→Y and Y→X
relationships; the time span that is covered by data on X
and Y; the direction of the feedback (negative or positive);
and the (non)linearity of the relationships. In verifying
causal recursion, it is further important to note that outcome
4 is a necessary but insufficient condition for presence of a
feedback loop. For instance, consider two simple time
series X=sin(t) and Y=cos(t). In these data, a feedback
loop is absent, while both X→gY and Y→gX will produce
equally well fitting models: we need only remember that
cos(t)=sin(t+π/2) and sin(t)=cos(t−π/2). Also, in Error
Correction Models such as the one applied by Kauffmann et
al. (2006: p. 256), if the model produces significant
parameters with Y as effect (i.e., dependent variable), it will
at the same time produce significant parameters with X as
effect (this is so because the mathematical model specifies
the two variables in terms of linear combinations of each
other). In both cases, the data will result in outcome 4, and
other kinds of evidence than the verification of statistical
model fit are needed to decide what the proper direction of
the causal relationship is (see, e.g., Hausman 1982). A
possible strategy for obtaining such evidence is outlined in
the next section.
2.3 Qualitative model validation and falsification
By verifying causal relationships, we only see one side of
the coin when, in fact, we need to see both sides in other to
show that the coin is genuine. That is to say, a verifying
modeling procedure must be supplemented by a falsifying
one. It was suggested by Van der Zouwen and Van Dijkum
(2001: 237) that the formulation of potential falsifiers in
recursive models can be based on qualitative mathematical
knowledge:
A qualitative strategy may result in the identification
of nullclines and equilibria which put constraints on
the set of (differential) equations and make it possible
that whole sets of models are falsified and others
verified.
Qualitative mathematical knowledge is equally useful in
the validation of relatively simple constituent non-recursive
models, that is, causal chains that are parts of the fully
specified model.
For example, we may establish that X indeed precedes Y
(and not vice versa) by placing constraints on the pattern of
minima and maxima of the time series (see also Van
Dijkum et al. 2001). Formally, we may require that first
(and higher order) derivatives of the cause predict, with a
given time lag, first (and higher order) derivatives of the
effect:
@
@t
X!g @
@t
Y:
Notably, if, in a given time span, maxima (minima) of
X are not consistently followed (let alone preceded) by
maxima (minima) of Y, then the hypothesis that X is a
precursor for Y may be considered falsified. This, in
turn, requires a time span of measurements where
changes of the gradients must be detected for both X
and Y. Furthermore, the time series of derivatives must
be computed independently for X and Y (artifacts are
produced if they are derived from differentiation of the
autoregressive models used for establishing G-causality!),
for instance, by the use of splines (see, e.g., de Boor
1978).
Obviously, the qualitative strategy of model validation
requires a theory about causal relationships that can be
expressed in a mathematical model. It also requires data
of substantial quality. For instance, if the AGW hypoth-
esis is to be confirmed, data are required that quantify
the amount of human produced CO2 as separated from
the amount produced by other sources (e.g., volcano's) and
as separated from the amount of CO2 dissipated in oceans
for a time span that covers theoretically justified time lags
(perchance in the order of centuries). An “aggregate”
causal variable that combines radiative forcing of green-
house gasses, anthropogenic sulfur emissions, and radia-
tive forcing of solar irradiance cannot provide “direct
evidence that, since 1870, human activity is largely
responsible for the increase in global surface temperature”
(cfr. Kauffmann et al. 2006: 225, 250). Of course,
evidence that the simple non-recursive causal chain is
valid (conceptual hypothesis) mounts with increasing
numbers of maxima and minima that follow the
regularity constraint (operational hypothesis). However,
the precise point when evidence changes into proof
remains to be a subjective decision based on consensus
among scientists.
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3 Concluding remarks
The fact that a true experiment (one including control groups)
is not feasible in the case of studying causality relating to
warming on Planet Earth does not mean that the weaknesses
of correlational research do not apply in climate research. A
well-known weakness of such research designs refers to fact
that absence of proof (of spurious relationships) does not
imply proof of absence (of spurious relationships). In order to
scientifically corroborate the AGW hypothesis, the present
focus on verification of the AGW hypothesis should shift
towards a focus on its falsification. A potential falsifier is
when empirical data fail to show that maxima (minima) of
the cause (e.g., human produced CO2) produce, at a
specified time lag, maxima (minima) of the effect variable
(e.g., global temperature). The latter requirement necessitates
the availability of time spans of data that are large enough to
display changes in the gradients of both cause and effect
variables, and the application of models that allow for
inference on derivatives.
As said, the challenge in corroborating any causal
hypothesis is to determine what kinds of evidence consti-
tute actual proof of the hypothesis. The field of verification
and falsification of recursive spatial–temporal causality is
underdeveloped and merits future research. Meanwhile,
consensus among scientists will remain to play a great role
in deciding when empirical evidence suffices as proof of a
causal hypothesis. However, in adopting Swanborn's (1996)
“regulative idea of striving after truth by consensus within
the scientific community over research results”, we are always
in danger of replacing the purpose of science (knowledge) with
a by-product of science (consensus in the form of “common
sense”). Karl Popper's requirement of a sound scientific
theory, that it should produce counter-examples that falsify its
validity, serves as a first line of defense against this danger.
Of course, failure to find falsifying evidence in empirical data
will render the AGW hypothesis much stronger.
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